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art 'art n. 4 a : the conscious use of skill and creative
imagination especially in the production of aesthetic objects;
also: works so produced1
design di-'zln n. 6 : the arrangement of elements or details in a
product or work of art 7 : a decorative pattern 8 : the creative art of
executing aesthetic or functional designs2
I
Introduction
The distinction between art and design has historically been
between fine art and the lesser or useful arts. Sadly, clothing design
tends to fall in the latter category and is largely unprotected under
United States ("U.S.") law, despite the U.S.' general trend toward
longer, stronger intellectual property protection in many other
categories. Apparel constitutes about 0.4% of U.S. Gross Domestic
Product, a small but important segment of the U.S. economy. The
majority of clothing sold in the United States is manufactured in low-
wage countries and purchased from discount retail stores. Discount
clothing is the fastest growing segment of the apparel sector, with
sales rising by 15% to $60 billion over the 1998 - 2000 period.
Additionally, an estimated 75% of all shoes purchased in the United
States are bought at discount retailers such as Wal-Mart. In order to
compete effectively in the discount retail space, U.S. apparel
companies are under extreme pressure to reduce costs. One way to do
this is to produce knockoffs of popular apparel designs using less
expensive materials and outsourcing labor abroad. This is an
acceptable practice in this country as for the most part; clothing
design is unprotected as an intellectual property right. While one has
only to look at the recent controversy over the distribution of black
berets to all members of the U.S. Army to realize the importance of
clothing to Americans' sense of identity, it has also been ingrained in
the American psyche that excellent clothing design is appreciated but
not worth paying for. This article will explore the shortcomings in
1. Merriam Webster OnLine Collegiate Dictionary <http://www.webster.com/
home.htm> (accessed April 1, 2001).
2. Id.
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current patent, copyright, and trademark laws with respect to clothing
designs; discuss the reasons why design legislation has often been
introduced in this country but never enacted; and, finally, argue that
the enactment of clothing design protection laws would benefit both
U.S. consumers and clothing designers.
II
Clothing Design Protection Under Patent Law
"It is with some trepidation that I venture to determine what is
the 'ordinary skill' of designers of intimate articles of feminine
apparel because such skill, at least to a mere man, seems to have no
ordinary limitations."3
Utilitarian items, such as clothing, are the proper realm of patent
law. Under its umbrella of coverage are utility patents, design patents,
plant patents, and business method patents. Historically, clothing
designs have obtained some protection under both utility patent and
design patent protection.
A. Utility Patents
Patents typically protect works of scientific or engineering merit,
or in Constitutional language, "discoveries" in the "useful arts."4 The
first patent statute was enacted in 1790, assigning the task of
determining whether inventions were "sufficiently useful and
important" to merit a patent to a distinguished group of federal
officers: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War and the
Attorney General.5 Patent laws have evolved continually from that
time, balancing a delicate tension between "grant[ing] a monopoly for
every trifling device"6 and encouraging innovation and the disclosure
of trade secrets. In the current patent statute, The Patent Act of 1952
("The Patent Act"), patentable inventions are divided into four
general categories: processes, machines, articles of manufacture, 7 or
3. H.W. Gossard Co. v. Neatform Co., Inc., 143 F. Supp. 139, 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
4. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
5. Donald S. Chisum, Chisum on Patents, § 2 (1997).
6. Id. at § 5 (citing Justice Bradley in Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192 (1883)).
7. Id. at § 1.02. ("[I]t is the residual class of 'product' patent--encompassing all
man-made items not found in substantially the same form in nature that are neither
machines nor compositions of matter.")
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compositions of matter.8 Classification into a category is of little
importance to the rights the patent owner obtains; it is generally
conceded that the categories of machine, articles of manufacture and
composition of matter together include the vast majority of manmade
structures, referred to as "product" patents.9 Examples of utility
patents granted for clothing include: "[b]ra with straps for matching
clothing,' '. "[o]dor absorbing clothing,"" and a cape with a special
pocket by which the cape can be folded into a pillow or used to store
gloves when not so folded. 2
In order to be eligible for utility patent protection, an invention
must satisfy several criteria set forth in sections 102 and 103 of The
Patent Act.'3 These requirements are generally reduced to four
standards: originality, utility, novelty, and nonobviousness. The first
requirement, originality, limits the filing of patent applications only to
the true inventor of an invention.14 This requirement restricts patent
grants to the first person or persons who discovered the invention and
not to a subsequent inventor or someone who has surreptitiously
appropriated the invention. This requirement is of particular
importance in the U.S. patent system, where patent rights are granted
on a "first to invent" basis'5 rather than on a "first to file" basis, the
prevailing international standard. The second requirement, utility,
mandates that an invention must perform a positive benefit to
society.'6 This is measured by a three-part test: the invention must be
capable of producing the intended result, perform some minimum
human purpose, and not serve a purpose that is illegal, immoral or
contrary to public policy. 7 The third requirement, novelty, "lies at the
heart of the patent system"'8 and requires a stringent showing that all
of the features of a proposed invention (1) were not patented or
otherwise described in a printed publication anywhere in the world
more than one year prior to the filing of the patent application, (2)
8. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
9. Chisum, supra n. 5, at § 1.02.
10. U.S. Patent No. 6,186,861 (issued Feb. 13, 2001).
11. U.S. Patent No. 6,134,718 (issued Oct. 24, 2000).
12. U.S. Patent No. 4,078,264 (issued Mar. 14, 1978).
13. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102-103 (2001).
14. 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2001); see also Chisum, supra n. 5, at § 2.01.
15. 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) (2001). In other words, the first person to invent the invention
will have priority over a subsequent inventor, even if that inventor was the first to file a
patent application.
16. See Smith v. Nichols, 88 U.S. 112, 118 (1874); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
17. Chisum, supra n. 5, at § 4.01.
18. Id. at § 3.01.
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were not known or used in the U.S. more than one year prior to the
filing of the patent application, and (3) were not previously invented
by a U.S. inventor more than one year prior to the filing of the patent
application.19 If an invention is not novel, it is unpatentable. °
Finally, the inventor must also demonstrate a fourth
requirement, nonobviousness.2" Nonobviousness requires that the
invention not be "obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains."22 In other words, the invention should not be readily
apparent to the average person skilled in that field based on
previously disclosed inventions. To determine whether a claimed
invention was obvious, the following factors are considered: the scope
and content of the prior art, the differences between the prior art and
the patent claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art . Secondary factors, such as the degree of commercial
success of the invention, whether the invention satisfied a long-felt
need, and whether others expressed skepticism that the invention
could be made, may also be considered in the obviousness
determination. 5
After satisfying the four tests outlined above, the invention must
then be disclosed and described in the patent application. The patent
must disclose both how to make and how to use the invention in a
manner such that a person "skilled in the art" could reproduce and
use the invention.6 In exchange for this disclosure, the inventor
receives the exclusive right to manufacture and sell the invention for
a period of twenty years.2 ' The patent claims determine the scope of
protection afforded by a utility patent, with an emphasis on the literal
19. Id. at § 3.01; see also 35 U.S.C. § 102 (a), (b), (e), and (g).
20. Id. at § 3.01.
21. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
22. Id.
23. See Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229 (1975); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383
U.S. 1, 37 (1965).
24. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 559 F. Supp. 229, 234-35 (N.D. Ala. 1983), affd
in part, modified in part, rev'd in part, 722 F.2d 1542, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
25. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); Truswal Sys. Corp. v. Hydro-
Air Engr., Inc., 813 F.2d 1207, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal
Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-
Hind, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 450 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Cable Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc.,
770 F.2d 1015, 1026 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d
1530, 1539-40 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
26. 35 U.S.C. § 112 1 (1999).
27. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (1999).
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language of the claims." Claims are therefore of key importance and
are drafted as broadly as possible to prevent others from designing
around the patent claims to create a non-infringing product. For
example, U.S. Patent No. 6,212,686 for an "Expandable shirt collar"
has 17 claims.2 ' The first claim is broadest and describes the invention
as it currently exists.3" The other 16 claims are narrower dependent
claims and describe alternate methods of achieving the same result,
including use of different materials and different methods of
attaching the collar to the neckline of the shirt.31
Should the patent issue, the inventor has the right to sue
unauthorized manufacturers of the. invention for infringement,
regardless of whether the infringement is innocent or intentional. In
order to determine whether a patent has been infringed, the court
conducts an infringement proceeding. During this proceeding, the
court will determine the exact meaning of the patent claims32 and
compare the accused device to the patent claims to determine
whether every limitation set forth in the patent claim is present in the
infringing device either literally or by a substantial equivalent.33
Therefore, in order to avoid a finding of infringement, a copyist must
design around the claims of a utility patent, creating a product that is
essentially a good substitute for the patented invention rather than an
exact replacement.
Because redesigns of existing patents are often difficult to
achieve, clothing designs that qualify for utility patent protection
generally receive strong protection, particularly if the underlying
utility patent technology dictates the outward appearance of the
article. The weakness of utility patents for clothing, however, is that
there is nothing to restrict a copyist from designing a garment with a
similar appearance but a different underlying technology. For
example, in Flanagan v. Continental Apparel Corp.," while three of
the defendant's sports bras were similar enough to the plaintiff's to
28. Antonious v. Spalding & Evenflo Co., Inc., 98-1478, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
22984, *7 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (noting that other aids to interpretation include the written
description of the invention and the prosecution history of the patent).
29. U.S. Patent No. 6,212,686 (issued Apr. 10, 2001).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
33. See generally Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Intl., Inc., 141 F.3d 1088
(Fed. Cir. 1998); Markman, 52 F.3d at 978-80; Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d
1533, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Circle R, Inc. v. Smithco Mfg., Inc., 919 F. Supp. 1272,
1295 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
34. 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12102 at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 1996).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [24:169
CLOTHING DESIGN PROTECTION PITFALLS IN UNITED STATES LAW
warrant the plaintiff filing for patent infringement, only one of the
bras was ultimately deemed infringing.35 To obtain a monopoly on the
appearance of the invention, inventors must look to design patent
law.
B. Design Patents
Congress enacted the first design patent laws in 1841.36 The
subject matter covered by these laws included:
any new and original design for the printing of woolen, silk,
cotton, or other fabrics.., any new and useful pattern, or
print, or picture, to be either worked into or worked on, or
printed or painted or cast or otherwise fixed on, any article
of manufacture, or any new and original shape or
configuration of any article of manufacture.
In order to obtain such a patent, a showing had to be made that
the inventor had invested time, effort and expense to develop the
design and that the design had not been known or used by others
prior to the filing.38 A design patent initially afforded protection for
only seven years, while utility patents received protection for fourteen
years.39 In the latest revision of design patent laws, The Patent Act,
Congress changed the lengthy list of covered subject matter to a
simple statement that "any new, original, and ornamental design for
an article of manufacture"4 is eligible for protection for a fourteen
year term," six years less than the twenty year term granted utility
42patents.
Design patents are a strange compromise between copyright,
trademark and patent protections. While the threshold requirement
35. Id. at *19.




40. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2000).
41. 35 U.S.C. § 173 (2000).
42. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). There is not much legislative history to be found as
to how Congress determined the length of design patent protection. In a 1914 hearing on
proposed design legislation, The Commission of Patents, who had proposed a period of 20
years of protection, justified his choice as follows: "I do not particularly care as to the
length of time, but it seemed to me that perhaps 20 years was not unreasonable."
Registration of Designs: Hearing on H.R. 11321 Before the House Comm. on Patents, 63d
Cong. (1914) (statement of Hon. Thomas Ewing, U.S. Commissioner of Patents).
2002]
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for a copyright is a minimum standard of originality,43 design patents
require a stricter combination threshold standard of originality,
novelty, and nonobviousness, and also require that the design be
ornamental.44 Design patents do not require a showing of utility as is
required for utility patents. Indeed, articles dictated solely by
considerations of function are barred from design patent protection,46
similar to functionality restrictions in trademark law.47 The litmus test
for functionality of design patents has been formulated as follows:
the design of a useful article is deemed to be functional
when the appearance of the claimed design is 'dictated by'
the use or purpose of the article.... When there are several
ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture,
the design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily
ornamental purpose.48
Just because a design consists of some utilitarian elements will not
result in a denial of protection so long as the design viewed as a whole
49is not dictated by the utilitarian purpose.
While demonstrating that a design is not dictated by functionality
concerns is one challenge, the primary difficulty clothing designs have
faced in achieving design patent protection is demonstrating
nonobviousness. In the clothing design field, the standard courts have
applied is whether the design would be obvious to a skilled
dressmaker "who has, or is chargeable with, knowledge of the prior
art."50 The judiciary developed this standard to set a very high bar for
new designs. "[M]ore is required for a valid design patent than that
the design be new and pleasing enough to catch the trade; it must be
the product of 'invention,' by which is meant that conception of the
43. Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.01[A] (Lexis
Publg. 1999) ("Originality in the copyright sense means only that the work owes its origin
to the author, i.e., is independently created, and not copied from other works."); see also
Alfred Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951)
("[N]othing in the Constitution commands that copyrighted matter be strikingly unique or
novel.").
44. Chisum, supra n. 5, at § 1.04[2] (citations omitted).
45. See In re Harvey, 12 F.3d 1061, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 1993) ("Unlike an invention in a
utility patent, a patented ornamental design has no use other than its visual appearance.").
46. Chisum, supra n. 5, at § 1.04[2] (citations omitted).
47. See e.g. Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Lab., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10 (1982);
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122 (1938).
48. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
49. Id. (deeming valid a design patent for an athletic shoe even though some of the
design elements added to the cushioning and support features of the shoe).
50. Neufeld-Furst & Co., Inc. v. Jayday Frocks Inc., 112 F.2d 715, 716 (2d Cir. 1940).
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design must demand some exceptional talent beyond the skill of the
ordinary designer."51 Varying the scale of a prior known design is not
sufficient,52 nor is combining known design elements in a novel way.
3
In fact, the nonobviousness standard is so demanding that even new
clothing designs that do not incorporate any known design elements
can still fail to qualify for design patent protection. 4 Some courts have
expressed doubts that clothing could ever qualify for design patent
protection," and there is some suggestion that the main use for design
patents is not to protect design but rather as a fallback for inventions
that cannot obtain utility patent protection. 6
If a clothing design is able to qualify for design patent protection,
the scope of protection can be substantial. Design patents have a
single claim and the scope of protection "is limited to what is shown
51. Id. (citing Nat Lewis Purses, Inc. v. Carole Bags, Inc., 83 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1936)).
52. Nat Lewis Purses, Inc., 83 F.2d at 476 (finding invalid a design patent for a
compact purse because "no more was really involved than changing the size" of a prior
design).
53. Neufeld-Furst & Co., Inc., 112 F.2d at 716 (finding that plaintiff's dress design
was merely a combination of dress design elements known in the prior art and therefore
invalid); see also H. W. Gossard Co., 143 F. Supp. at 143 (denying protection for the novel
arrangement of an elastic trim on a girdle which encircled the leg and then angled toward
the front panel of the girdle).
54. White v. Lombardy Dresses, Inc., 40 F. Supp. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (holding that a
style of "junior type" dresses by Syd Novak knocked off by the Defendant for $5 U.S.
dollars ("USD") did not satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness standards, even though
the dresses did not contain known dress design elements nor were they combinations of
prior known dress designs).
55. H.W. Gossard Co., 143 F. Supp. at 143 ("In fact, it has been said that to invent
anything in the way of a new dress design, however temporarily attractive such design may
be, becomes almost impossible when one considers the enormous amount of fashion
advertising, design service, magazines, and the host of skillful and intelligent
dressmakers.") (citations omitted); Lombardy Dresses, 40 F. Supp. at 217 ("In this case
alone we have the claim made by Novak that he has conceived dozens of inventions of
dresses. Each season, the claim is made, that invention after invention is brought forth,
yet, the state of the art makes the correctness of such assertion more than doubtful, and
while the granting of the patent carries the weight which is attached to such act of the
government, the facts on the trial and the state of the art duly proved, makes one wonder
how any patent on such dresses can be obtained provided true invention is required. A
dress may be new, original and attractive and yet not be patentable unless this faculty of
invention is likewise present.").
56. H.R. Comm. on Pat., Registration of Designs: Hearing on H.R. 11321, 63d Cong.
97 (May 27, 1914) (statement of E. W. Bradford, Esq., Representing the National Design
Registration League, Washington D.C.) (discussing the example of a clothesline holder
which had obtained design patent protection but which Bradford could find nothing
"ornamental or attractive" about it); see Levi Strauss & Co. v. Golden Trade S.r.L, 1995
WL 710822 at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1995) (deeming several claims in a utility patent on
stonewashing denim that related to the end appearance of the fabric invalid and more
properly the subject of design patent law).
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in the application drawings."57 In order to prove infringement of a
design patent, it is not necessary to show that the infringing design is
identical to the original, but that it must be similar enough "such that
an ordinary observer would be likely to purchase one thinking it was
the other."5 When making the comparison, a court should consider
the design in its entirety, and compare the accused design to the
claimed design and not to the commercial embodiment of the design
in a product." Additionally, infringement of a design patent cannot be
disclaimed by prominently labeling a look-alike product with another
trademark.60
This "ordinary observer" test is clearly difficult to apply and the
results are often very subjective. In Avia Group International v. L.A.
Gear California, Inc.,6 the Federal Circuit upheld the district court's
finding that defendant's emulation of the plaintiff's tennis shoe sole
was similar enough to infringe the design patent, although not exact
in every detail . In Rockport Company, Inc. v. Deer Stags, Inc. ,63 the
court found that the design patent for walking shoes was infringed
even though the defendant's shoes had altered the shape of the mud
guard as well as the "double layer of shoe extending from the bottom
of the eyestay to between the second and third eyelets."'  In
Aerogroup International v. Marlboro Footworks,65 the court engaged
in a detailed comparison of the soles of five of defendant's shoes
against plaintiff's design patent and ultimately determined four were
not infringing and one possibly was, though the exact reason for this
conclusion is not entirely clear.66
57. In re Mann, 861 F.2d 1581, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1988) ("Design patents have almost
no scope."); see also L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1122 ("A patented design is ordinarily claimed
'as shown,' that is, by its drawing.").
58. Lee v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 838 F.2d 1186, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
59. Payless Shoesource Inc. v. Reebok Intl. Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 990 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
60. L.A. Gear, Inc., 988 F.2d at 1125.
61. 853 F.2d 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
62. Id. at 1565-66 ("[W]e have in the incriminated or accused sole copying of the
swirl effect, copying of the separate coloration and configuration of the pivot point,
though without the red dot.").
63. 65 F. Supp. 2d 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
64. Id. at 195-96.
65. 1997 WL 83395 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27,1997).
66. Id. at *3-4. The court noted the distinguishing aspects of plaintiff's sole were its
border, closely spaced horizontal lines and diamond shaped recesses. All of defendant's
soles, including the possibly infringing heel, had significant variations, including a large
diamond in the middle of each heel. Id. at *8-13.
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C. Patent Law as a Model for Design Protection
While utility patents continue to serve a purpose for clothing
designs, which are functional in some way beyond mere decoration of
the body, this protection covers only a small percentage of the
clothing designs created. Design patents, while intended to provide
broader protection, are difficult to obtain because of the nonobvious
requirement. However, even if design patents were easier to obtain,
they are an unattractive form of design protection for the clothing
industry for many reasons. First, the expense involved in obtaining a
design patent can be considerable. In addition to paying attorney fees
to draft the patent application, the applicant must also pay filing and
issuance fees. The current fee for filing a design patent application
with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ranges from $160 to $320
USD and the issuance fee ranges from $220 to $440 USD.
67 Also, each
design patent must be subjected to a lengthy examination process
before the design patent is issued, with common delays at the patent
office. In 1975, the Patent Office had a goal of reducing average
pendency for design patent applications to 18 months." In 1997, the
average pendency for a patent application was 22.2 months with a
goal to reduce pendency to 12 months or less for all inventions.
69 With
the business lifespan of the average clothing design lasting only one
season (a few months to a year at most) design patent protection
would come far too late to be of much value. °
67. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Patent Filing Fees, Patent Post-Allowance
Fees <http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/qs/ope/1999/fee
20 00lOOl.htm> (accessed May
5, 2001). Note that in 1914, when design patent fees were only $10 ($178 in 2001 USD) for
a 3-year term of protection, designers considered the fee "absolutely prohibit[ive]" and a
proposal to lower the fee to $1 ($17.85 in 2001 USD) was even considered exorbitant.
Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 211.
68. H.R. Subcomm. on Cts., Civ. Liberties and the Admin. of J. of the Comm. on the
Jud., Copy. L. Rev.: Hearings on H.R. 2223, 94th Cong. 168 (1975) (testimony of Rene D.
Tegtmeyer, Assistant Commissioner for Patents, Department of Commerce).
69. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Bus. Goals and Objectives, the Pat. Bus. Env.
<http://www2.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/coiilp/budg/plan/> (accessed May 5, 2001).
70. Reebok Intl. v. J. Baker, Inc., 32 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (The court
determined the scope of the remedies for infringement based upon whether the patentee
and the infringer were still selling the patented item. Reebok was no longer manufacturing
the SHAQ I shoe by the time its design patent was issued. Upon the issuance of the
patent, Reebok sued Baker who had begun manufacturing the infringing shoes during the
pendency of the design patent. Since neither Reebok nor Baker was manufacturing
SHAQ I shoes by the time the suit was instituted, the court found that an injunction
against sale of 33,000 pairs of infringing shoes still in Baker's stock was unwarranted.
Reebok's reputation would not be harmed by the sale and could be addressed by money
damages.).
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The patent process favors inventions with a long or unlimited
commercial life, primarily in the utility patent arena. Utility patent
applicants receive several advantages that design patent applicants do
not. For example, a utility patent applicant may opt for a one-year
provisional patent71 in which the inventor submits a simpler
application containing a description and drawings of the invention
and pays a lower fee.72 Under the provisional patent process, the
inventor also gains an experimental period in which to determine the
marketability of the invention. No such opportunity to test the waters
is afforded for design patent applicants. Likewise, while utility patent
applicants are allowed to use their inventions in an experimental way
more than one year before filing a patent application without risk of a
novelty challenge, no such defense is recognized for design patents.73
These limitations only add to designers' frustrations with the
patent system. After many years of failing to shoehorn clothing
designs into the rigid design patent scheme presumably intended for
their protection, designers have sought a more sympathetic ear from
other forms of intellectual property protection.
III
Clothing and Copyright
"Individual perception of the beautiful is too varied a power to
permit a narrow or rigid concept of art."7
U.S. copyright law applies to "original works of authorship fixed
in any tangible medium of expression" that are created under the
guise of eight enumerated categories of works recognized by the 1976
Copyright Act ("the Copyright Act").75 While clothing does not fit
71. 35 U.S.C. § 111(b) (West 2000); see also supra. n. 67.
72. Currently $75-$150 USD. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, supra n. 67.
73. In re Mann, 861 F.2d at 1582 ("We see no way in which an ornamental design for
an article of manufacture can be subject to the 'experimental use' exception applicable in
the case of functioning machines, manufactures, or processes. Obtaining the reactions of
people to a design-whether or not they like it-is not 'experimentation' in that sense. In
the case of a design, if market testing shows that it has no appeal and the design is
changed, the result is a new and different design; the original design remains just what it
was.").
74. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,214 (1954).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2000). The eight categories of works are: literary works;
musical works; dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; pictorial, graphic
and sculptural works; motion pictures and audiovisual works; sound recordings; and
architectural works.
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readily under any category in this list, the best fit would likely be
"pictorial, graphic and sculptural works," i.e., clothing as a wearable
sculpture.76 If this classification were available, clothing would be
placed on a par with other works of art. Clothing designers would
obtain the benefits of a relatively easy and inexpensive registration
process and the risk of overprotection and stifling of creativity would
be minimized through fair use and independent origination defenses.
However, this form of copyright protection is not available to clothing
designers, due primarily to a policy known as the "useful articles
doctrine" which limits copyright protection for items with a functional
as well as artistic purpose. There are also objections on artistic
grounds as to whether clothing design really ought to qualify as "art."
A. The Useful Articles Doctrine
Section 113 of the Copyright Act, informs us that there is an
important exception to the protection of works in the pictorial,
graphic and sculptural category. "This title does not afford, to the
owner of copyright in a work that portrays a useful article as such, any
greater or lesser rights with respect to the making, distribution, or
display of the useful article so portrayed than those afforded to such
works under [federal or state] law."" This statement is commonly
known as the "useful articles" doctrine and expresses Congress'
desire to limit the ability of manufacturers to monopolize designs
dictated solely by the function the article is to serve, such that the first
manufacturer to adopt the design would have the exclusive right to
produce those kinds of products.78 The rationale of the useful articles
doctrine is an attempt to draw a line in the sand between copyright
76. Note, however, an argument could be made that clothing designs might be
classified as a type of "architectural works" under § 102(a)(8). 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8).
However, § 101 defines architectural work as "the design of a building" and clothing as a
"wearable building" is more of a stretch than clothing as a "wearable sculpture" (although
some analogies could be drawn between foundation garments and building frames). 17
U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 113(b) (2000).
78. While the legislative history does not give an exact rationale for the useful
articles doctrine, a "useful article" is defined in § 101 of the 1976 Copyright Act as "an
article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance
of the article or to convey information." See generally H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 54 (Sept. 3,
1976) (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 (mentioning the Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S.
201, opinion as a basis for much of the useful articles doctrine)); Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217-18
(recognizing that there is some tension between patent law and copyright law as to the
protection of useful articles but determining that copyright protection for useful articles
can exist regardless of patent law protection).
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and patent law.
The useful articles doctrine is an important consideration when
dealing with works of "applied art,"79 where artistic works are merged
with functional items normally covered under patent law. Examples
of applied art include artistic designs printed onto fabrics or
wallpaper, tiles, or other media. The concern in applied art situations
is whether the work must qualify for protection under patent law,
copyright law, or perhaps both. Before the enactment of the 1976
Copyright Act, the leading case on the subject of applied art was
Mazer v. Stein, in which the Supreme Court determined that a
sculptured lamp base could be subject to copyright protection
because the base, when separated from the lamp, had artistic merit.'
Congress adopted the Mazer approach in the drafting of the 1976
Copyright Act and devised a "separability" test for useful articles in
which one looks at the item in question to determine whether the
"pictorial, graphic, or sculptural" parts of the work can be either
physically or conceptually separated from the utilitarian, functional
parts of the work.8' The parts of the work that can be physically
removed and displayed as works of art or that can be thought of
separately as artistic works are protected under copyright law, while
the overall combination of the copyrighted and functional parts is
not."' Congress gives us the example of silver flatware with a floral
design on the handle.83 The design of the eating utensil part of the
flatware, being a useful article that does more than convey its
appearance or information, is not protected, but the floral design
itself is protected.Y Therefore, a copyist could produce floral flatware
79. See J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 Duke L.J. 1143, 1146 n.
7 (1983) ("Applied art is not defined by any copyright legislation, although nearly all
domestic copyright laws expressly mention applied art among the works protected."); see
also H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 54 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667) ("In accordance
with the Supreme Court's decision in Mazer v. Stein ... works of applied art encompass all
original pictorial, graphic and sculptural works that are intended to be or have been
embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass production, commercial
exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent protection.").
80. 347 U.S. at 218.
81. See H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 55 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668) ("Unless
the shape of an automobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or any
other industrial product contains some element that, physically or conceptually, can be
identified as separable from the utilitarian aspects of that article, the design would not be
copyrighted under the bill.").
82. Id. ("[Clopyright protection would extend only to [the copyrighted] element and
would not cover the over-all configuration of the utilitarian article as such.").
83. H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 55 (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5668).
84. Id.
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nearly identical to the original without fear of infringement, so long as
the handle incorporated a sufficiently different floral design and the
flatware was not otherwise protected under design patent or
trademark law.
Clothing is clearly a "useful article," whether one considers its
function to be protecting its wearer from the elements, ensuring
modesty, or symbolizing occupation, rank or status. Clothing is much
more than decoration for the body. Thus, in order for a clothing
design to qualify as protected under U.S. copyright law, the design
must meet the separability test outlined above. Some aspects of
clothing design will easily meet this test. For example, a cabled design
on a sweater," a geometric design to be printed on fabrics," or an
image screen printed on a T-shirt' could all be separable from the
garment, and therefore, copyrightable. The difficulty with this test for
clothing, however, lies in the fact that the majority of skill in
designing clothing lies in determining the correct shape and fit of the
clothing, i.e. creating a flattering neckline, designing the drape of a
sleeve, or tailoring a suit.' These are all elements that cannot be
physically separated from the clothing itself and are difficult, if not
impossible, to separate conceptually.
Conceptual separability is not an easy concept to understand or
formulate a consistent test for, as witnessed by the Second Circuit's
trio of opinions on the matter. In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
Pearl, Inc.,89 the Second Circuit determined that a belt buckle design
could be copyrightable.Y The court applied a conceptual separability
test where an item could be copyrightable if the decorative or
aesthetically pleasing aspect was "primary" and the utilitarian
function is "secondary. '" 9' In this case, the belt buckles were at times
worn as decorative jewelry on other parts of the body. The court
determined that the frequency of the utilitarian use versus the
85. Banff Ltd. v. Express Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065, 1067 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
86. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v Brenda Fabrics, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 142, 142-43 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
87. Central Mills, Inc. v. Iced Apparel, Inc., 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1798 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7, 1998).
88. As Germano Celant describes, "The cut is the soul of clothing. It severs the
endless thread of a garment as the simple container and portrait of the human figure and
transforms it into a creative act, a language that builds new objects." Germano Celant, To
Cut is to Think, in Art/Fashion 22 (Germano Celant ed., 1997).
89. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
90. Id. at 993.
91. Id.
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frequency of aesthetic use was not a factor.92
Five years after Kieselstein-Cord, a dissenting judge in the
Second Circuit advanced a second conceptual separability test in
Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover, Corp.93 In this case, Barnhart
had designed dress forms for the display of clothing which the court
ultimately deemed uncopyrightable under the useful articles
doctrine. 4 The test for conceptual separability advanced by the
dissent was whether "the article [stimulates] in the mind of the
[ordinary, reasonable] beholder a concept that is separate from the
concept evoked by the utilitarian function."'95 Clearly, this is a very
subjective test, involving the ordinary observer's personal conception
of what constitutes art. The dissenting judge realized this and could
only lament that "as long as 'conceptual separability' determines
whether the design of a useful article is copyrightable, some threshold
assessment of art is inevitable." 96
Finally, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pacific Lumber
Company,' the Second Circuit had to determine whether a curved S-
shape bike rack could qualify as a sculpture. 98 The court framed the
test for conceptual separability this time as whether the design
elements could be identified as reflecting the designer's artistic
judgment and not dictated by functional influences.' In this instance,
there was no copyright protection in the work because the court
deemed the S-shaped curves in the bike rack were mandated by its
functional purpose and, therefore, did not involve the designer's
artistic judgment.1"
This tangled spaghetti of separability tests is confusing and
subjective to say the least. A clothing designer choosing to assert
copyrightability for her creations therefore has three options: argue
for complete copyrightability of the designs addressing each of the
separability tests; find a way to define the designs as something other
than a useful article and avoid the separability tests altogether or
settle for partial copyrightability for judicially recognized separable
aspects of the designs. Designers have used all three tactics.
92. Id.
93. 773 F.2d 411, 442 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting).
94. Id. at 412.
95. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 423 (Newman, J., dissenting).
97. 834 F.2d 1142 (2d. Cir. 1987).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1145.
100. Id. at 1148.
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B. Working Around the Useful Articles Doctrine: Clothing As Art
To avoid the useful articles doctrine, clothing designers have
attempted to argue that their designs are not useful articles at all, but
rather, works of art that just happen to fit the body. In the Ninth
Circuit case of Poe v. Missing Persons,' the designer of a swimsuit
made of clear plastic and filled with crushed rock made for an art
exhibition, successfully sued for copyright infringement when a
member of a rock band wore the swimsuit on the band's album
cover. 2 The Poe court reversed a finding of summary judgment for
the band based on the useful articles doctrine finding that the
swimsuit was a work of art and not a useful article and therefore
protected under copyright law. 3 The court suggested that evidence
useful to distinguish between works of art and useful articles includes:
expert evidence; the creator's intent when making the work (i.e., did
the creator intend to make a work of art that just happens to look like
clothing or did the creator intend to create clothing which was
eventually recognized as art); custom and usage in the art trade
regarding such articles; and the marketability of the item as a work of
art."
While Poe was a welcome recognition that clothing design can
sometimes achieve the status of art, subsequent cases in the Ninth
Circuit indicate that Poe is likely to be a rare exception. The recent
case of Lim v. Green,05 demonstrates that the Poe exception for
clothing will not extend to works that have been mass-produced or
that were designed with the intent that they might someday be mass-
produced. In Lim, Lim claimed that his "Scarf Cap" designed for
motorcycle riders was a "soft sculpture. ' '  The court quickly
dismissed this argument because Lim designed the Scarf Cap with the
intent that Harley Davidson might be interested in purchasing the
design for its line of motorcycle accessories and because Lim had
caused the item to be mass-produced.1 7 As much of clothing is
101. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
102. Id. at 1241.
103. Id. at 1242.
104. Id. at 1243.
105. 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 29291 (9th Cir. Nov. 13,2000).
106. Id. at *3.
107. Id. Note that this formulation of the useful articles doctrine contradicts the
legislative intent. Legislative commentary on the useful articles doctrine states, "works of
'applied art' encompass all original pictorial, graphic and sculptural works that are
intended to be or have been embodied in useful articles, regardless of factors such as mass
production, commercial exploitation, and the potential availability of design patent
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designed to be mass-produced, the Poe argument cannot be used as a
protection mechanism in the large majority of cases. One
interpretation of the Poe test, demonstrating its limited coverage, is
that copyright protection will only attach to shapes that are
"independent of the human body shape (beyond mere accentuation
of a feature, such as padded shoulders).' ' 8
Other circuits have developed their own lines of cases on the
issue of clothing as art. In Whimsicality v. Rubie's Costume
Company,'°9 the Second Circuit utilized the separability test
developed in Brandir to determine that Halloween costumes were not
copyrightable because "the very decorative elements that stand out
[are] intrinsic to the decorative function of the clothing.
110
Whimsicality was cited in Knitwaves, Inc. v. Lollytogs, Ltd. for the
proposition that "clothes are not copyrightable" because they are
useful articles.' as well as in cases from other circuits.1 2 The
Knitwaves court, however, did recognize copyright infringement for
sweater designs of leaves and acorns, because fabric designs are
considered "writings" and are therefore protected under copyright
law."
3
The Third Circuit has yet another view. In Masquerade Novelty,
Inc. v. Unique Industries, Inc.,"4 the court determined that animal
nose masks were copyrightable as soft sculptures because their only
utility was in evoking a humorous response."5 The court indicated
that evoking a human response is a function served by many
copyrightable works."6 "The utilitarian nature of an animal nose mask
or a painting of the crucifixion of Jesus Christ inheres solely in its
protection." H.R. Rpt. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667).
108. Peter K. Schalestock, Forms of Redress for Design Piracy: How Victims Can Use
Existing Copyright Law, 21 Seattle Univ. L. R. 113, 124 (1997) (citing a suggestion made
by attorney David Gryce in Poe).
109. 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989).
110. Id. at 455.
111. 71 F.3d 996, 1002 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30737 (2d Cir.
Nov. 22, 1996) (citing Whimsicality, 891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also Adelman v.
Summers & Gordon, Inc., 112 F. Supp. 187, 189 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) ("There are no provisions
in the Copyright Law for protecting fashions for dresses. The right to make and sell an
artistically designed garment may under proper circumstances be obtained by a design
patent issued from the Patent Office but not by copyright.").
112. Lim v. Green, 243 F.3d 548 (table), 2000 WL 1693680 (9th Cir. 2000); Eve of
Milady v. Impression Bridal, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); H20 Swimwear Ltd. v.
Lomas, 164 A.D.2d 804, 806 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).
113. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1003 (citations omitted).
114. 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990).
115. Id. at 669.
116. Id. at 771.
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appearance, regardless of the fact that the nose mask's appearance is
intended to evoke mirth and the painting's appearance a feeling of
religious reverence.', 1 7 From the diverse opinions of the Second,
Third and Ninth Circuits, we see that clothing as art is still very much
a judgment of the eye of the beholder.
C. U.S. and International Perceptions of Design as Art
One might reasonably inquire as to why the U.S. is so opposed to
granting artistic status to functional objects and seems obsessed with
separating the useful from the artistic via stringent, separability
standards. While a division of copyright and patent law might be one
explanation, another explanation comes from the art world.
The line between artist and artisan has always been an
indistinct one, ceaselessly renegotiated. On the one hand, it
is the job of the artisan to make objects designed for use and
convenience, whereas the work of the artist is regarded as
non-instrumental - you can't do anything with a painting
except look at it - and, when it is successful, it is valued, not
simply for the opulence of its materials or its decorative
appeal or its technical expertise (although it may share all
these qualities with artisanal work), but for its adherence to
a set of higher values which have been elaborated by experts
in art history and aesthetics. These values, certainly since
the time of Kant, have been explicitly defined as non-
instrumental, as values of disinterested design, sensibility,
style and imagination, removed from the practical concerns
of everyday life. 8
Garment design has traditionally been viewed as artisanal rather
than artistic and has enjoyed varying degrees of appreciation in the
art world throughout history."9 In early history, garment designers
were looked down upon as servants because of the intimate nature of
the relationship between the garment and its wearer and valued lower
on the social ladder than painters or architects.2 The status of fashion
designers steadily improved, beginning in the 1850's with the rise of
couturier Charles Worth and continued into the 1900's with the Arts
117. Id. at 671.
118. Peter Wollen, Addressing the Century, Addressing the Century: 100 Years of Art
& Fashion 7 (Hayward Gallery, ed. 1998).
119. Id. at 8.
120. Id.
and Crafts revival."' However, fashion still remained a curious sort of
"art" well into the Twentieth Century. In 1954, when photographer
Cecil Beaton wrote a history of fashion and the decorative arts, he
felt it necessary to defend himself against the charge of being a
"propagandanist of frivolity" because "both in England and America,
fashion is viewed with a jaundiced eye." '122 Now, in the Twenty-First
Century, we are still attempting to define the value of clothing design
and much controversy has erupted over the display of fashion
retrospectives in traditional art museums. 3
Ironically, adding to the confusion over whether fashion is art is
the fashion world's viewpoint that clothing as "art" has a negative
connotation. "The suspicion grows that the... definition of
art/fashion is something so avant garde that it is unwearable....
Genuine fashion must be functional and, therefore, can only be
classified as applied art or craft. If a garment is not wearable, it is not
fashion."'24  Indeed, many fashion designers do not think of
themselves as "artists. ' This non-artist designation, however, is not
121. Id. at 8-9.
122. Jane Ashelford, The Art of Dress: Clothes and Society, 1500-1914, 7 (1996).
123. The "Giorgio Armani" Retrospective (Guggenheim Museum, New York City,
N.Y., Oct. 20, 2000 - Jan. 17, 2001); compare Deborah Sugerman, Behind the Scenes,
MPLS-St. Paul 211 (Aug. 1, 2000) ("'[Fashion] is becoming more accepted by academics,
whether they look at it as art or more anthropologically."' (quoting Mark Schultz, co-
curator of Goldstein Gallery at the University of Minnesota)) with Roberta Smith, Memo
to Museums: Don't Give Up on Art, N.Y. Times § 2, at 1 (Dec. 3, 2000) ("I'm not sure that
Mr. Armani's development merits a museum exhibition, especially a museumwide one. He
seems to be less an innovator than a brilliant tailor."); Judith Shulevitz, Armani Speaks
Softly, Carries Big Stick, Slate Mag. (Oct. 25, 2000) ("That will probably be the take-away
from the Guggenheim show too-they tried to tell you it had something to do with art, but
you knew all along it was just about the clothes.").
124. Suzy Menkes, Playing to the Galleries: Wannabe Art; Fashion's Crossover
Moments, Intl. Herald Trib. 12 (Oct. 13, 1998); see also Commercial Interludes, Women's
Wear Daily 6 (Mar. 15, 1999) ("[F]ashion is a business, and once the exhausted fashion
flock disperses and the Carrousel du Louvre lies dormant, everyone wants the clothes to
sell.").
125. See Snapshot: Introducing the Dutch Masters; Bored of Versace? Tiring of
Mcqueen? Fear Not, Says Josh Sims - Holland's New Breed of Conceptual Fashion
Designers are out to Save the Day, Indep. 9 (Jan. 14, 2001) ("Viktor Horsting and Rolf
Snoeren of Viktor & Rolf balance out the uneasy art-fashion equation. 'Some
experimental fashion can be really ridiculous, but it's important for us that our clothes are
wearable,' says Snoeren. 'We trained as fashion designers, but our work has had the
attention of the art world. This isn't art for the art world. Perhaps it's art for the fashion
world."'); Menkes, supra n. 124 ("Miuccia Prada, who is always prepared to push fashion
to its limits, says that she herself is nervous about going over the edge. 'My job is fashion,'
she says. 'Any time I feel myself getting too 'artsy,' I go back to my fashion roots. Of
course you see what is happening in art and that influences you. But we have our art
foundation. Maybe I'm wrong, but I want to keep them separate."'); CNN Larry King
Weekend, Fashion Designer Karl Lagerfeld Talks about His Friendships with Princess
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an admission that designers are less talented than artists or that their
works are any less valuable. Rather, this view recognizes that art and
design are different paradigms that serve different purposes and are
inspired by different muses. The following comments from fashion
designers provide some insight on this view.
What I do is not art - it is a commercial creation. I'm the
exact opposite of an artist; everything I do is about what is
happening at the last possible second. Fashion is perishable.
M . . aybe good fashion design . . . is a kind of art. It is
certainly a form of artistic expression.'
[O]ur work is only made to be consumed, worn, used. An
artist may escape from reality to fantasy. We are not allowed
to forget the body.
While the U.S. has opted for a function-free standard of "art"
under copyright law, other countries have adopted an entirely
different approach. France, for example, has adopted a "unity of art"
approach in which "every test of aesthetic creation that 'would allow
industrial art to be separated from real art' [has been rejected]."'28
While France also struggled with the definition of art, attempting to
keep a line of demarcation between its sui generis design laws and
Diana and Gianni Versace (CNN Sep. 20, 1997) (television broadcast) (quoting Karl
Lagerfeld as saying: "You can teach the craft [of fashion], but there has to be a little more
than that, the eye, the wish, the desire and to think also that fashion is important without
being too serious about it.... When they start to say it's art and personality, I'm easily
bored."); Bridget Foley, et al., Master class: Fashion Group Names Seven Men Masters of
Design, Women's Wear Daily 6 (Sep. 19, 1997) ("As for his own work, is it art? 'I would
rather speak of my strengths and advantages as a designer,' [Yohji] Yamamoto says.).
126. Jessica Kerwin, Under the Influence: Fashion designers reflect on the stuff that
moves them most, W Magazine, 434 (Sep. 2001) (comment of Tom Ford, designer of Gucci
and Yves Saint Laurent).
127. Id. (comment of Christian LaCroix).
128. J.H. Reichman, Design Protection in Domestic and Foreign Copyright Law:
From the Berne Revision of 1948 to the Copyright Act of 1976, 1983 Duke L.J. 1143, 1157
(1983). Note also that French copyright law enumerates clothing designs as one of the
types of works it protects. See UNESCO, Law on the Intellectual Property Code
<http://www.unesco.org/ culture/copy/copyright/ france/pagel.html#pl> (accessed May 6,
2001) (translation of French copyright law) ("The following, in particular, shall be
considered works of the mind within the meaning of this Code: ... 14. creations of the
seasonal industries of dress and articles of fashion. Industries which, by reason of the
demands of fashion, frequently renew the form of their products, particularly the making
of dresses, furs, underwear, embroidery, hats, shoes, gloves, leather goods, the
manufacture of fabrics of striking novelty or of special use in high fashion dressmaking,
the products of manufacturers of articles of fashion and of footwear and the manufacture
of fabrics for upholstery shall be deemed to be seasonal industries.").
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copyright laws, ultimately France decided to grant designers
protection under both schemes. However, they added incentives to
use the design protection by affording evidentiary advantages as to
proof of ownership, transfers of title and restricting competition.9
This decision has not been without controversy, in that "[m]any...
were dismayed to see the laws of literary and artistic property expand
to protect the designs of such articles as plastic salad bowls, drinking
glasses, fireplace grates, a hair brush, the luggage rack of a motor
scooter, and the hexagonal head of a lubricating pump."'3 ° Opponents
of the unity of art approach have generally adopted one of two
different schemes. The "duality of art" approach is typified by Italy,
where copyright is reserved for art that has an independent existence
from functional concerns, while useful articles could be protected
under sui generis design laws.' The other position is typified by
Germany where a limited number of exceptional designs are
protected under copyright law but the rest are covered under sui
generis design laws.'32
While the intellectual property laws of European countries in
particular have evolved to cover functional articles, we are still highly
suspicious of such protection in the United States. There are no
indications that we will change this policy in the near future.
However, there have been some advances in further dissecting useful
articles to locate artistic elements worthy of protection.
D. Working Around the Useful Articles Doctrine: Partial
Protection
For the lucky few aspects of clothing design that are able to pass
the physical and conceptual separability tests of the useful articles
doctrine, copyright law provides a good deal of protection. Fabric
designs, in particular, have benefited from copyright protection.'33 In
Peter Pan Fabrics v. Brenda Fabrics,34 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York found that a fabric design consisting
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1159.
131. Id. at 1161.
132. Id.
133. See Prince Group v. MTS Prods., 967 F. Supp. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (protection
for "mega dot" pattern of irregularly shaped polka dots); Textile Innovations, Ltd. v.
Original Textile Collections, Ltd., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7695 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (protection
for floral pattern).
134. 169 F. Supp. 142 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
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of images suggestive of the Near East was entitled to copyright
protection "both as a work of art-and as a print."'3 5 This decision
contrasted with historical notions that fabric designs were not
protected under copyright law.'36 Sweater designs, such as cable
patterns and color motifs, have also had a good deal of protection
against infringement,' as have lace designs'38 and jewelry.'39
The distinction between protection for separable elements of the
clothing design but not for the clothing itself can be quite confusing.
Interestingly, in the case of Eve of Milady v. Moonlight Design, Inc.,1"'
the court, in its off-the-record infringement analysis, went beyond a
comparison of the two lace patterns involved in the case to a
determination of the similarity of the wedding dresses in which the
lace patterns were incorporated, including the fullness of the skirts,
the necklines, the kick-pleats, and the V point of the sleeves. "' This
analysis tends to rebut the presumption that comparison of clothing
designs as a whole is too difficult and subjective for judges to
accomplish.
While fabric patterns and design motifs, such as appliqu6s,
sweater embellishments or lace ipatterns, are protected under
copyright law, this is not a great deal of protection for-the clothing
135. Id. at 143.
136. See Verney Corp. v. Rose Fabric Converters Corp., 87 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y.
1949) ("While the design may have been properly registered as a print for an article of
merchandise, plaintiff, by printing it on the fabric from which the dresses are
manufactured, uses the design as a part of the article of merchandise itself.").
137. See Segrets, Inc. v. Gillman Knitwear Co., 207 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2000) (granting
summary judgment for copyright infringement of a blanket stitch design and a primitive
pattern to be used on sweaters), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 76 (2000); Banff Ltd. v. Express
Inc., 921 F. Supp. 1065 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (protecting an Aran-style sweater consisting of a
"combination of cabled patterns, traditional stitching and hand crocheted roses" against
infringement by the Express retail clothing chain); In Design v. Lauren Knitwear Corp.,
782 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (protecting a colored triangle pattern designed by Sasha
Kagan against a similar redesign by Lauren Knitwear).
138. See Imperial Laces v. Westchester Lace, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18679, at *7 n. 5
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) ("It is undisputed that fabric designs, including lace designs, are
copyrightable."); Eve of Milady, 957 F. Supp. 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (deeming lace designs
incorporated into wedding dresses copyrightable).
139. See Boucher v. Du Boyes, Inc., 253 F.2d 948 (2d Cir. 1958) (deeming costume
jewelry copyrightable subject matter under Mazer, 347 U.S. 201); but see Judith Ripka
Designs v. Preville, 935 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (determining no infringement for two
lines of "ancient inspired" jewelry composed of jewelry elements which had been around
"for ages"); DBC of N.Y., Inc. v. Merit Diamond Corp., 768 F. Supp. 414 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)
(denying copyright protection for a diamond ring design composed of elements well-
known in the jewelry trade, such as marquise cut diamonds, trillions and a knife-edged
shank).
140. 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21288 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1998).
141. Id. at *13-31.
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designer. A knockoff designer cannot replicate the copyrighted fabric
or motif exactly but can design a fabric pattern or motif that is
extremely similar. When this similar fabric or motif is used in an
identical copy of the overall garment design (which in most cases is
not protected and can be copied with impunity), the result is a near-
perfect copy of the original garment.
E. The Idea-Expression Dichotomy Hurdle
An interesting side note to the to the disappointing protection
for clothing design provided by the useful articles doctrine, is that
designers also face copyright protection hurdles under the idea-
expression dichotomy in copyright law. Section 102(b) of the
Copyright Act provides that "[i]n no case does copyright
protection ... extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle or discovery. 142 This doctrine has
been restated as "copyright protects the expression of an idea but not
the idea itself." '43 The implications of this doctrine for designers are
illustrated in the case of Russell v. Trimfit, Inc.144 In Russell, the
designer had copyrighted two drawings of unusual sock designs."'
One sock design had a separate compartment for the big toe.146 The
other design had separate compartments for each toe.147 Trimfit, a
major sock manufacturer, began manufacturing socks identical to
Russell's drawings and Rusell brought suit for copyright
infringement.14 ' The court determined that Russell's copyright only
entitled her to protection against copying of the drawings
themselves.'49 Since Trimfit did not copy her drawings in the
advertising or packaging of their product, Russell had no claim for
copyright infringement. Thus, courts are not likely to extend
copyright protection to clothing surreptitiously through protection of
drawings or pattern pieces. 5'
142. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
143. Craig Joyce et al., Copyright Law 125 (5th ed. 2000).
144. 428 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
145. Id. at 92.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 92-93.
148. Id. at 93.
149. Id. at 93-94.
150. Id. at 95.
151. Cf. Galiano v. Harrah's Operating Co., Inc., 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17258 at 11-
12 (E.D. La. 2000) (denying summary judgment for copyright infringement when the
defendant made clothing similar to Plaintiff's copyrighted drawings).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [24:169
CLOTHING DESIGN PROTECTION PITFALLS IN UNITED STATES LAW
F. Copyright Law as a Model for Design Protection
Clearly, existing copyright law is insufficient to address the needs
of the clothing design industry. Some argue that this is entirely
appropriate as the danger that copyright law would be used to allow
designers to monopolize common design elements and stifle creativity
is too great.' Copyright law, however, is the most attractive of the
existing intellectual property protections for a number of reasons.
First, works claiming copyright protection do not need to be
registered to be protected, "3 nor are they required to display the
copyright symbol.' As it is common in the clothing trade to produce
a variety of designs (sometimes thousands of designs per year'55) and
let the market decide which designs are valuable,'56 this would
alleviate the burden on designers to register all of their designs,
including the unsuccessful ones, to obtain protection. A designer
could simply register the design once it had been infringed and sue for
copyright infringement.
A second reason why copyright protection is desirable as the
model for design protection is the limited scope of copyright
protection. Copyright is not a fourteen year exclusive monopoly on a
design or any confusingly similar forms of that design, as would be
granted in design patent law. While the length of protection for
copyrighted works is considerably longer than that afforded to design
152. Jo Carillo, Protecting a Piece of American Folklore: The Example of the Gusset, 4
J. Intell. Prop. L. 203, 223 (1997).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 408(a) (2000) ("[R]egistration is not a condition of copyright
protection."); but see 17 U.S.C. § 411 (20(10) (requiring registration before institution of a
copyright infringement action); 17 U.S.C. § 412 (2000) (limiting the availability of
statutory damages and attorney's fees to registered copyrights).
154. See 17 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2000) ("[A] notice of copyright as provided by this
section may be. placed on publicly distributed copies.") (emphasis added). Note, however,
that encouragement to provide copyright notice is provided by § 401(d) in that notice will
negate a defense for the reduction of actual or statutory damages based on innocent
infringement.
155. Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 211 (statement of Mr. M. Hefti, Vice
President of the Embroidery and Lace Manufacturers' Association of New Jersey,
estimating the number of designs produced by a smaller designer at 1,500-2,000 per year).
The number of designs produced by larger manufacturers of fabric and lace may be as
many as 60,000 - 80,000 per year. Id. at 89 (statement of W.B. Bradford, representing the
National Design Registration League).
156. Id. at 105 (statement of W.B. Bradford, Representing the National Design
Registration League) ("Many of the designs we pick out and think are worth
registering.., prove unpopular... and the ones we do not think worth registering are the
very ones that the public buy.").
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patents, one could argue that registration of designs will not reduce
the public domain pool of design elements because copyright
protection would extend only to the particular expression or
combination of elements and not to the individual design elements
themselves. Additionally, under principles of fair use, designers
would be free to use the same or similar design elements of others so
long as the total combination of the elements is not an exact copy of
the original design. Just as copyright law has encouraged and not
stifled creativity in the fine arts and music, it is capable of providing
the same benefits to clothing design.
Despite the persuasiveness of this argument, current copyright
law does not support such protection. Designers, scorned by the
copyright system, have resorted to trademark and unfair competition
laws.
IV
Clothing Design Protection Under Trademark Law
"Regretfully, the body of law relating to the Lanham Act has
developed into a tangled morass ... Courts struggling to move
mountains often find they have only affected minuscule changes in
trademark jurisprudence and occasionally have created their own
likelihood of confusion.
'158
Trademark protection is a very attractive form of intellectual
property protection for clothing designers for two main reasons. First,
the duration of protection is potentially unlimited so long as the
"word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof"15 9
continues to serve as a source indicator for consumers. Secondly,
because of the overlap between federal trademark law and common
law trademark law, federal registration is not a prerequisite for
protection."6 Clothing designers have typically made use of the
157. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) ("Copyright ... subsists from its creation and.., endures
for a term consisting of the life of the author and 70 years after the author's death.").
158. Coach Leatherware Co. v. AnnTaylor, Inc., 933 F.2d 162, 171 (2d Cir. 1991)
(citations omitted).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).
160. 15 U.S.C. § 1115(a) (2000) ("[This act] shall not preclude another person from
proving any legal or equitable defense or defect.., which might have been asserted if such
mark had not been registered."). However, the Lanham Act does provide many incentives
for registration. See e.g. id. (affording prima facie evidence of validity of the registered
mark).
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trademark system to police the marks they employ in labeling their
goods. For example, Ralph Lauren's trademarks "POLO" and the
logo of a polo player have been upheld against infringement on
numerous occasions. 1' Since many designers outsource the
manufacturing of their clothing to other countries, protection of these
marks is critical to prevent international trademark piracy and the
importation of gray market goods into the U.S.162
In addition to protection for labels, trademark law is sometimes
employed to protect the design of a product itself, under the rubric of
trade dress protection. "Trade dress" refers to either the packaging or
dressing of a product or the design of the product itself and has been
accorded trademark protection due to the broad definition of
registrable marks under § 2 of the Lanham Act.' While trade dress
can be registered as a trademark,' 6' trade dress infringement actions
are generally brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which
functions as an unfair competition law for unregistered goods. In
order to achieve protection under § 43(a), the trade dress must be
nonfunctional'6 6 and the infringer's product must be likely to cause
confusion.67 Courts have also imposed the requirement that the trade
dress be distinctive.168 Clothing designs have faced hurdles under all
three of these requirements.
161. Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 145 (4th Cir. 1987); Polo Fashions,
Inc. v. J&W Enterprises, 786 F.2d 1156 (4th Cir. 1986); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Dick Bruhn,
Inc., 793 F.2d 1132 (9th Cir. 1986); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Branded Apparel Merchandising,
Inc., 592 F. Supp. 648 (D. Mass. 1984); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. The Gordon Group, 627 F.
Supp. 878 (M.D.N.C. 1985); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Extra Special Products, Inc., 451 F.
Supp. 555 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
162. See A.V. by Versace, Inc. v. Gianni Versace, S.p.A., 126 F. Supp. 2d 328
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (granting a preliminary injunction against a U.S. manufacturer's sale of
goods bearing the marks "Alfredo Versace" and "A.V. by Versace" both in the U.S. and
abroad); Calvin Klein Industries, Inc. v. BFK Hong Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (allowing an injunction against sales of jeans labeled with the Calvin Klein label
both in the U.S. and abroad when Calvin Klein canceled the manufacturing contract after
many of the jeans had been produced. The court deemed that such a broad injunction was
necessary to protect Calvin Klein's international licensing contracts.).
163. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000).
164. If trade dress is registered, infringement actions can be instituted under § 32 of
the Lanham Act.
165. See Coach Leatherware Co., 933 F.2d at 168.
166. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(3) (2000).
167. Id. § 1125(a)(1)(a).
168. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 210 ("Nothing in § 43(a) explicitly requires a producer
to show that its trade dress is distinctive, but courts have universally imposed that
requirement, since without distinctiveness the trade dress would not 'cause confusion...
as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of [the] goods,' as the section requires.").
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A. The Functionality Barrier
The U.S. Supreme Court clarified the test for trade dress
functionality in TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.169
Here, the Court reiterated the test established in Qualitex Company
v. Jacobson Products Company,7' explaining that functionality is a
broad concept, which includes consideration of whether the feature
claimed is a competitive necessity but also whether the feature "is
essential to the use or purpose of the device or when it affects the cost
or quality of the device..'.'. If a design is determined to be functional,
it will be ineligible for Lanham Act protection, regardless of the
secondary meaning it has achieved with consumers."'
The functionality bar in trademark law applies not only to
features of utility, but also to features that are "aesthetically
functional." '173 Aesthetic functionality inheres in a product when a
"design feature is so important to the value of the product to
consumers that continued trademark protection would deprive them
of competitive alternatives." '174 When a design is found to be
aesthetically functional, courts often severely limit the scope of
protection for such designs under trademark law. For example, in
Wallace International Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art
Company,'75 the court found that a Baroque pattern for silverware
could only be enforced as a trademark as to a particular expression of
the pattern and not to preclude Baroque silverware patterns in
general."6
Clothing designs are generally found to be aesthetically
functional because the "primary purpose is aesthetic-to enhance the
[garments'] ornamental appeal-rather than to identify the
[garments] as [products of a particular producer.]j 77 As such, a
clothing designer cannot obtain a monopoly over the use of design
elements in general but can enforce trademark rights to the extent
169. 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
170. 514 U.S. 159 (1995).
171. Traffix Devices, 532 U.S. at 31-33.
172. Id. at 34-35.
173. See generally W. T Rogers Co. v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334 (7th Cir. 1985) (finding that
a hexagonal design for office supply trays was not aesthetically functional because it was
not essential for competition).
174. Id. at 347.
175. 916 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1990).
176. Id. at 78-82. Note that the court's analysis sounds oddly similar to the
idea/expression dichotomy in copyright law.
177. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1006.
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necessary to prevent consumer confusion. In making the
determination between the aesthetically functional elements and the
protected trademark elements, it appears that courts have been
subconsciously influenced by the useful articles doctrine in copyright
law. Trade dress cases often show greater deference to separable
design features rather than designs comprised of an overall concept
with no separable elements. For example, in Coach Leatherware
Company v. AnnTaylor, Inc., the Second Circuit denied a finding of
trade dress infringement when AnnTaylor mimicked the details of
Coach handbags because the court felt that granting a broad
protection to ornamental design elements in the bags would
excessively chill competition.'78 Four years later in Knitwaves, the
Second Circuit held that Knitwaves could not prevent Lollytogs from
manufacturing "fall motif[s]" for sweaters in general but could restrict
Lollytogs use of particular combinations of squirrels, acorns and
leaves, which were confusingly similar to Knitwaves' designs.179 Even
the recent ruling from the Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Brothers, Inc., demonstrates this dichotomy.80 In Wal-Mart,
the Court denied trade dress protection for the total concept of one-
piece children's seersucker outfits decorated with appliquds, but yet
the lower courts noted the potential challenge of copyright
infringement for the appliqu6s. "' There is no express reason for these
distinctions. Seemingly the courts are concerned that with the lengthy
protection afforded by trademark law, it is better to err on the side of
caution and limit trade dress protection to design elements that can
be concretely identified.
B. The Confusion Barrier
Evidence of consumer confusion, the second requirement in a §
43(a) suit, can also be difficult for infringed clothing designs to
demonstrate. For some courts, this requirement is intertwined with
178. 933 F.2d at 171.
179. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d at 1006. Note that the court in Knitwaves ultimately did not
find trade dress infringement had occurred.
180. 529 U.S. 205. The court did not specifically address the functionality doctrine in
this opinion.
181. 165 F.3d 120, 132 (2d Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds, 529 U.S. 205. Note that
here, the Second Circuit, possibly evidencing a trend toward greater trade dress protection
for clothing, found that Samara's trade dress was distinctive in that it involved the
combination of a variety of unique design elements and that consumer confusion was
likely based on the extent of the copying done by Wal-Mart.
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the aesthetic functionality determination.182 The Knitwaves court, for
example, found that because some of the design elements were
aesthetically functional, they could not serve as source indicators and
therefore consumers could not be confused by similar uses of those
design elements.'83 Generally, tests for confusion under trademark law
involve an analysis of factors set forth by the Second Circuit's
Polaroid decision."8 These factors include strength of plaintiff's mark,
degree of similarity between plaintiff's and defendant's marks,
proximity of the products; likelihood that plaintiff will bridge the gap,
evidence of actual confusion; defendant's good faith in adopting the
mark, quality of defendant's product or service, and sophistication of
buyers.' In Coach Leatherware, the standard for consumer confusion
was set very high, with the court indicating that similarity of
appearance or consumer surveys were not dispositive of the issue.86
In Hermes International v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc.,87
however, the court found that confusion could result even if
consumers were not confused at the time of purchase as to whether
they were purchasing a genuine item or a knockoff.'1 8 Post-sale
confusion, where an outside observer might think the knockoff
purchaser had purchased an original, could also support a finding of
consumer confusion.'89 Thus, while the confusion analysis is somewhat
unpredictable, it appears to be difficult to demonstrate if the trade
dress is not already well known to consumers, a requirement
addressed by the third prong of trade dress protection.
C. The Distinctiveness Barrier
The final requirement for trade dress protection is
distinctiveness. The United States Supreme Court has determined
that trade dress is distinctive when the "intrinsic nature [of the trade
dress] serves to identify a particular source."'9 ° In Two Pesos, Inc. v.
182. See e.g. Knitwaves, 71 F.3d 996.
183. Id. at 1006.
184. Polaroid Co. v. Polarad Elecs. Co., 287 F.2d 492,495 (2d Cir. 1961).
185. Id.
186. 933 F.2d at 169 (declining to find evidence of confusion even when the President
of one of the infringing companies could not identify the differences between an infringing
bag and the original).
187. 219 F.3d 104 (2d. Cir. 2000).
188. Id. at 109.
189. Id. at 108 (citing Mastercrafters Clock & Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Le
Coultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464,466 (2d Cir. 1955)).
190. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992).
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Taco Cabana, Inc., the Court found that the unregistered trade dress
of a Mexican restaurant was inherently distinctive and did not require
a showing of secondary meaning.'91 This decision provided hope that
courts might construe the distinctiveness requirement for trade dress
flexibly and incorporate greater design protection within its realm.
One commentator suggested that clothing designs would qualify for
such protection.' These hopes were dashed, however, by the
Supreme Court's Wal-Mart decision, which distinguished the Two
Pesos case as applying only to cases of product packaging and
indicated that product design, including clothing design, is not
inherently distinctive and requires secondary meaning.93  "To
establish secondary meaning, a manufacturer must show that, in the
minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature or
term is to identify the source of the product rather than the product
itself.""'4 One commentator has suggested that this bright-line rule
that product designs can never be inherently distinctive does not take
account of the range of possible designs available and deals clothing
manufacturers a "double whammy" in their attempts to obtain design
protection.9  Defenders of Wal-Mart insist that the Court correctly
declined to create a test for inherent distinctiveness for trade dress,
because such a test would be impossible to apply uniformly.'96
The short-lived nature of most clothing designs makes a showing
of secondary meaning nearly impossible and thus most clothing
designs will fail to qualify for trade dress protection. Consumers are
very unlikely to be able to attribute a particular clothing design to a
particular designer, without the aid of trademarks, labels or a
substantial advertising campaign. This would place a tremendous
191. Id. at 776.
192. See S. Priya Bharathi, Student Author, There IS More than One Way to Skin a
Copycat: The Emergence of Trade Dress to Combat Design Piracy of Fashion Works, 27
Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1667, 1679 (1996).
193. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212 ("[D]esign, like color, is not inherently
distinctive."); Yankee Candle v. Bridgewater Candle, 107 F. Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass 2000)
("The Supreme Court's recent decision in Wal-Mart ... crushed most, if not all, of the life
out of plaintiffs statutory trade dress claim.").
194. Inwood Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.ll
(1982).
195. See Stuart M. Riback, Product Design Trade Dress, Where do We Go from
Here?, 90 Trademark Rep. 563, 566 (2000) (The double whammy arises because the nature
of the clothing industry is not to package products, therefore disqualifying clothing
manufacturers from the easier to obtain product packaging trade dress and raising the bar
for product design trade dress.).
196. See William D. Coston, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc.: The
Triumph of Consumer Protection in Lanham Act Litigation, 90 Trademark Rep. 572, 576
(2000).
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burden on the clothing designer to advertise extensively the attributes
of every design created which could very well be economically
impossible. The recent case of Lim v. Green demonstrates that in
order to satisfy secondary meaning requirements, consumers must
associate the design with a particular manufacturer and not merely be
aware that the design has existed previously." State unfair
competition laws or misappropriation laws may be similarly
unavailing. While these laws may have less stringent requirements
than those imposed by the Lanham Act, at least one case has held
that when the subject matter of protection falls clearly under federal
law, the state law is preempted.'98
D. Trademark Law as a Model for Design Protection
The Supreme Court's Wal-Mart decision puts trade dress for
clothing in a highly suspect position. Perhaps the Court is attempting
to foreclose any notion that design protection will be afforded
through trademark law. While the Court seems to recognize the need
for trade dress protection in certain cases, it is still a highly suspect
classification of trademark law. In TrafFix Devices, the Court
"caution[s] against misuse or over-extension of trade dress" and
asserts that "copying is not always discouraged or disfavored by the
laws which preserve our competitive economy. '
Trademark and trade dress protection, however, might not be
the ideal remedy for the protection of clothing designs. Unlimited
protection for certain features of designs could radically impact
competition and unduly limit designer creativity. It is also unclear
how trademark or trade dress protection for clothing design would
serve a consumer protection function. So long as the knockoff
manufacturer identifies his copies with the manufacturer's own label
(and not the trademark of the original designer) the likelihood of
consumer confusion is small. The price of the garment and the
channel of commerce in which it is purchased (retail discount store,
street vendor or unofficial websites) would also be further clues as to
whether a design is original. The long history of knockoff designs in
197. 243 F.3d 548 (table), 2000 WL 1693680 (finding that consumer association of the
plaintiff's Scarf Cap design with the motorcycle industry in general is not sufficient to
support secondary meaning).
198. Aldridge v. The Gap, Inc., 866 F. Supp. 312, 314 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (finding that
designs for children's clothing fell within the subject matter of copyright law and that
therefore state misappropriation laws were preempted).
199. 532 U.S. at 29.
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the United States is another argument against consumer confusion.
Americans are so used to purchasing knockoffs that one could argue
that there is an implied presumption that most affordable clothing is a
knockoff rather than an original design. Even proponents of the
extension of trade dress protection to the fashion industry recognize
that there are some practical considerations with the use of design as
a trademark and that litigation and enforcement could be difficult
under this model.2'
If trademark is the model to be used, however, there are ways to
creatively apply existing trademark law to design protection. For
example, as trademark rights are generally lost when the mark is no
longer used, one could argue that the unlimited protection may not be
as much of a threat. Instead of long-term monopolies, the design
elements might frequently change hands as designers evolve through
different phases of their careers, reviving old fashions and creating
new ones. Courts have yet to recognize these possibilities, though,
and lacking protection under any established intellectual property
scheme, frustrated designers have turned to Congress.
V
Sui Generis Protection for Clothing Design
"Not much sympathy is wasted on the vultures which hang over
the field of battle, waiting to feast on the fallen, even though they be
hungry and 'it is their nature to."'2 1
In an attempt to combat rampant design piracy, various types of
design legislation have been introduced in Congress at least 88 times
since 1914.02 Design protection was even included in the draft text of
200. See Karina K. Terakura, Insufficiency of Trade Dress Protection: Lack of
Guidance for Trade Dress Infringement Litigation in the Fashion Design Industry, 2001 U.
Haw. L. Rev 569, 615 (2001) ("A distinct style of one designer may be obvious to those
who shop at Neiman Marcus, but not so obvious to those who shop at Wal-Mart. Similarly,
identification of high-fashion designer clothing may be easy for those who read fashion
magazines and are aware of developing trends, yet confusing for those who do not read,
watch, or even care about fashion styles. It may be impossible to require every jury to
possess such an in-depth and sophisticated appreciation of the fashion world, but that is
what is necessary to understand, recognize and distinguish all the various designers' trade
dress styles.")
201. H.R. Comm. on Patents, Arguments before the House Comm. on Patents on H.R.
20172, To Amend the Patent Laws for Designs, 59th Cong. 4 (Feb. 14, 1907) (statement of
Mr. W. A. Bartlett, Patent Attorney) (referring to the vulture-like nature of design
pirates).
202. See S. 2502, 105th Cong. (1998); H.R. 2696, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1790, 102d
20021
the current U.S. copyright statute when it was proposed in 1975.203
This legislation suggested that a "Title II" be added to U.S. copyright
law affording protection for "original ornamental design[s] of...
useful article[s]."2" However, the legislation contained an express
exclusion that "[p]rotection under this title shall not be available for a
design that is ... (e) composed of three-dimensional features of shape
and surface with respect to men's, women's and children's apparel,
including undergarments and outerwear."2 5  Legislation nearly
identical to Title II, including the exclusion of protection for clothing,
was introduced as late as 1991.206 The legislative history of these
proposed design rights reveals a tapestry of interwoven vested
interests, and a perplexed Congress struggling to balance a desire to
promote innovation with concerns for the poorest members of
society. Design protection is extraordinarily controversial and even
small steps toward this end, such as the creation of a U.S. Design
Council to encourage innovation in design, have proved fruitless.2 7
The most common argument against design protection, as seen in
the legislative history, is that strong design protection will
significantly increase the cost of ordinary consumer goods. This
increase in cost will either arise as a result of higher royalties being
paid to designers, or in the form of increased costs for discount
manufacturers to attempt to "design around" protected designs and
fend off lawsuits.2 °8 In this context, clothing often gets lumped
together with protection for replacement parts for machines
necessary to our daily functioning, such as automobiles. Congress is
reasonably concerned with preventing manufacturers from charging
monopoly prices for replacement parts, particularly for items upon
which consumers depend the most and for which maintenance and
repair of the items serves a public safety interest. It is unfortunate
Cong. (1991); H.R. 3499, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 902, 101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 3017,
101st Cong. (1989); H.R. 379, 100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 1179, 100th Cong. (1987); S. 791,
100th Cong. (1987); H.R. 1900, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 2985, 98th Cong. (1983); H.R. 20,
97th Cong. (1981); H.R. 7270, 96th Cong. (1980); H.R.4530, 96th Cong. (1979); H.R. 2706,
96th Cong. (1979); see also Rocky Schmidt, Student Author, Designer Law: Fashioning a
Remedy for Design Piracy, 30 UCLA L. Rev. 861, 865 n. 30 (1983).
203. H.R. 2223, 94th Cong. (1975).
204. Id. at Title II § 201(a).
205. Id. at Title II § 202(e).
206. See H.R. 1790, 102d Cong. (1991).
207. H.R. 4673, 103d Cong. (1994).
208. H.R. Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. & Jud. Admin. of the Jud. Comm., Design
Innovation and Tech. Act of 1991, 102d Cong. 142-43 (Jan. 29, 1992) (testimony of Rhonda
J. Parish, Asst. General Counsel, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., on behalf of the Intl. Mass Retail
Assn.).
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that clothing design should be grouped with replacement parts in
these discussions. While clothing is a necessity in daily life, particular
styles of clothing usually are not. There are a wide variety of clothing
styles to choose from in a range of prices, depending largely on the
quality of the materials used. For the limited circumstances where
clothing is a necessity to accomplish a certain task, such as space suits,
bulletproof vests, and hard hats for construction workers, the analogy
to replacement parts may be more appropriate. Nevertheless, these
items are also more likely to be protected under patent laws.
The difficulty with grouping replacement parts with clothing
design is illustrated in Congressional hearings on proposed design
legislation in 1914.2°9 A replacement parts manufacturer for stoves
(which played a major role in heating homes at that time) objected to
the legislation on the following grounds:
Right here is a bill that is just as much as anything else
would be and more relating to the cost of living.., every
man would have to pay more for necessities like that. Why, I
do not know of a single article that would raise the cost of
living like that would because it is an absolute necessity.
°
Responding to this argument, the Commissioner of Patents replied:
Personally, I have not the slightest interest in the section [of
the bill relating to exclusions for replacement parts
manufacture]. The people I want to see protected are the
designers of textiles, the hat designers, the shoe designers -
the people who are dealing with the matter from the artistic
side. I think the objections that are raised about these repair
parts are probably very much exaggerated."'
In order for clothing design protection laws to succeed, it is
necessary to divorce clothing designs from the baggage of the
replacement parts question. It may also be necessary to enact
protection that only applies to clothing designs, as was done in the
case of vessel hull designs.' If the question of replacement parts
cannot be sufficiently resolved, individual sui generis protection for
every field in which design is a competitive element may be the trend
of the future.
209. Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 50.
210. Id. at 49-50.
211. Id. at 50 (statement of Hon. Thomas Ewing, U.S. Comm. of Pat.).
212. 17 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000) (protecting vessel hull designs).
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Even if clothing design can be divorced from the replacement
parts question, clothing faces its own unique forms of attack that have
more to do with psychology than economics. Sumptuary laws, which
attempt to regulate either the appearance or behavior of society, are
an interesting historical chapter of the history of clothing design.
Sumptuary laws have taken on a wide range of forms over many
centuries, but the two basic premises of sumptuary laws as they relate
to clothing are that certain symbols ought to be preserved as class
indicators and certain extravagant expenditures ought to be
prohibited either as "unholy" or economically unsound.213 An early
example of these laws is from the "Laws of Solon" in classical Greece,
which restricted conspicuous consumption at funerals, limited the size
of the funeral procession, the amount of food consumed and even the
number of mourning shawls a widow could wear."' Similar laws
developed in Europe and Asia, " and sumptuary laws were a part of
colonial life in the early U.S. 16 Sumptuary laws as they relate to
clothing fell into disuse in the U.S. around the middle of the
eighteenth century.217 One would hardly expect that such laws would
appear in modern society, particularly in a country such as the U.S.
where few restrictions on class movement exist and an emphasis on
equality of opportunity is ingrained in the country's history. However,
some contend that sumptuary laws are not merely an historical
artifact. One commentator has argued that strict enforcement of
modern trademark laws is a form of sumptuary law.1 ' Clearly, some
in Congress agree with this assessment and it has impeded the
development of design legislation.
At the 1914 design legislation hearings, a representative of the
National Design Registration League made the following argument in
support of strong design protection laws:
[Pirates] take that popular design of high-priced goods and
reproduce it in cheap material and put it on the market, the
213. Alan Hunt, Governance of the Consuming Passions: A History of Sumptuary
Law 18, 70-72 (St. Martin's Press 1996).
214. Id. at 18.
215. Id. at 23. (For example, feudal laws in China and Europe restricted the taming of
falcons and the wearing of furs to the upper classes.).
216. Id. at 39. (A 1651 Massachusetts Bay colony law prohibited luxury items such as
gold or silver lace, gold or silver buttons, silk hoods or scarves, and 'great boots' to those
with an annual income of less than e200.).
217. Id.
218. Malla Pollack, Your Image is My Image: When Advertising Dedicates
Trademarks to the Public Domain-With an Example from the Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984, 14 Cardozo L. Rev. 1392, 1422 (1993).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. r94.1 0
CLOTHING DESIGN PROTECTION PITFALLS IN UNITED STATES LAW
result being that the ladies going into their laundries see the
clothing of their colored cooks and wash girls trimmed with
the same pattern of lace they use on their expensive
garments.., she will not wear the same style of lace and
embroidery that is used by the servants in her household.219
Representative Callaway was clearly unimpressed by this
argument and, after it was noted that 75 percent of goods
manufactured in the U.S. were imitations of original designs,22°
facetiously inquired:
The trouble with this bill is that it is for the benefit of two
parties; that is, the enormously rich who want to display
their splendid apparel that they can wear in this country that
the ordinary riff-raff ought not to be allowed to wear, and
those [sic] rich concerns who have these extra and selected
designers to design these special patterns for those elite. I
think, too, the public ought to be cut out. I think those rich
elite ought to be segregated in this country and have the
immensely rich off in one place and the ordinary riffraff
ought not to be allowed to come and eat with them. Is not
that the whole sum and substance of [this bill]?22'
Unfortunately, the sumptuary law problem will continually be an
impediment to clothing design protection laws. Overcoming these
objections may require a resort to economic analysis. One
commentator has suggested that certain, laws, in which we allow
people of wealth to obtain status symbols unavailable to the masses,
may reduce the amount of waste spent by less affluent members of
society in making investments toward, but failing to obtain, these
same symbols.222 One could also attempt to alleviate these concerns
through the nature of design protection provided. For example,
design patent-type protection and trademark-type protection would
provide a broader, more monopolistic protection than would
copyright-type protection. Copyright-type protection could include
infringement defenses such as fair use223 and independent
219. Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 90 (statement of E. W. Bradford, Esq.,
Representing the National Design Registration League, Washington D.C.).
220. Id. at 94.
221. Id. at 94-95 (question of Rep. Calloway during the statement of E. W. Bradford,
Esq., Representing the Natl. Design Registration League, Washington D.C.).
222. Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 Yale L.J. 1, 19-20 (1992).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (listing factors to consider when determining whether a
use is fair).
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origination,224 which would allow a greater flexibility of use and lessen
concerns about exclusivity and class mobility.
Other concerns with sui generis design legislation entail
Constitutional and administrative questions.-The Constitutional issue
arises as a result of the Patent and Copyright Clause of the
Constitution which provides: "The Congress shall have Power ... To
Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." '225 While "writings" and
"discoveries" are clearly covered, it is unclear whether designs fall
within these categories. When this issue arose in committee hearings
for proposed Title II design protection in the 1976 Copyright Act, a
copyright attorney indicated that the scholarly weight of authority felt
that designs did meet this test."' The interrogating Congressman,
however, felt that the Patent and Copyright Clause was not a strict
mandate from the framers that only "writings" and "discoveries"
could be covered, but rather an illustration of the types of legislation
that Congress could enact.227 Regardless of which interpretation is
accepted, it appears that Constitutional concerns regarding design
protection are likely to be minimal, as evidenced by Congress'
willingness to enact paracopyright design legislation for
semiconductor chips228 and boat hulls.229
Administrative concerns are not so easy to resolve. One
objection to design legislation is that it would require the creation of
yet another government agency for intellectual property protection
and would duplicate functions already served 'by the patent, copyright
and trademark offices. 3 Some aspects of design protection would
inherently overlap with protections currently provided in all three of
these areas as noted above. However, a new government agency may
not be necessary. Conceptually, it would be possible to incorporate
design protection under the administration of an existing agency so
long as the existing scheme of protection and the design legislation
224. Nimmer on Copyright, supra n. 43, at § 13.01 [B] n.35.
225. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
226. H.R. Subcomm. on Cts., Civ. Liberties and the Admin. of J. of the Comm. on the
Jud., Copy. L. Rev.: Hearings on H.R. 2223, 94th Cong. 168, at 993 (1975) (testimony of
Alan Latman, Copyright Attorney).
227. Id. at 999.
228. 17 U.S.C. § 901 (2000) (Act protecting semiconductor chips).
229. 17 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(2) (section protecting vessel hull designs).
230. H.R. Subcomm. on Sci., Research and Tech. of the Comm. on Sci. and Tech., To
Promote Excellence in Design: Hearings on H.R. 7270, 96th Cong. 1.8-23 (Sept. 19, 1980)
(statement of Dr. David Levy, Executive Dean, Parsons School of Design).
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could peacefully coexist. The copyright office is a particularly
attractive organization for this purpose, given the large variety of
211
intellectual property works it has come to encompass.
Perhaps the largest obstacle to enacting clothing design
legislation is the adamant opposition from a powerful segment from
the very entity it aims to protect, the U.S. clothing industry.
Opposition can be traced to two main factors: a resistance to change
entrenched business methods that have evolved due to the history of
design piracy in the U.S.,232 and an inferiority complex about the
ability of American design to compete with European design. The
latter proposition is well supported by the history of American
clothing design, in which numerous examples can be found of the
frequent theft of European design by Americans.233 Examples can also
be seen in the legislative history of the 1914 design protection act
where a representative of the National Design Registration League
had the following to say:
I have been told by some manufacturers, when this matter
has been presented to them, "Oh, we can not live ... unless
231. For example, protection for computer software was a problem before copyright
embraced protection for computer programs as "literary works," despite overlap between
copyright law and patent law for these works. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (2000); H.R. Rpt.
94-1476, at 54 (Sept. 3, 1976) (reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667). The Copyright
Office has also recently enlarged its duties with respect to the area of software as a result
of the enactment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which includes restrictions on
the manufacture and sale of anti-circumvention technologies designed to overcome the
technological safeguards of copyrighted works. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 2001).
232. See Design Innovation and Tech. Act of 1991, supra n. 208, at 138 (testimony of
Rhonda J. Parish, Asst. General Counsel, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., on behalf of the Intl.
Mass Retail Assn.) ("The bill exempts all apparel. Why? Is it because American producers
and consumers obviously benefit from the ability to emulate foreign styles and adapt to
changing fashions and consumer preferences? If so, why does this rationale not apply to
other products?").
233. See Winning Ways, Inc. v. Holloway Sportswear, Inc., 903 F. Supp. 1457, 1459 (D.
Kan. 1995) ("Utilizing competitors' design features is common practice in the fashion
industry."); James Laver, Costume & Fashion 246 (rev. ed. 1995) ("Before 1930 it had
been the habit of buyers (especially American buyers) to purchase several dozen copies of
each selected model shown in Paris and resell them to a wealthy clientele. But after the
Slump the American authorities imposed a duty of up to 90 per cent on the cost of the
original model. Toiles (i.e., patterns cut out in linen) were allowed in duty-free. Each toile
was supplied with full directions for making it up, and although the original dress may
have cost a hundred thousand francs, it was now possible to sell a simplified version for as
little as fifty dollars."); Biography, "Edith Head" (A&E, Mar. 27, 2001) (television
broadcast) (American designer Edith Head never let on that the costumes she "designed"
for Audrey Hepburn in Roman Holiday were mainly those of French designer Hubert de
Givenchy.); Biography, "Calvin Klein" (A&E, Mar. 25, 2001) (television broadcast) (In his
early work for design houses in New York, Calvin Klein was sent to Europe to sketch
designs from the runways for reproduction in the United States.).
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we copy our competitors' designs. We can not produce
designs like they do in Europe." I always feel a little
ashamed of an American who will make that
acknowledgement because I believe that with the right kind
of protection and the right kind of encouragement, the
United States of America can lead in designing as it can lead
in everything else."'
Eighty-eight years have passed from the time this statement was
made and not much progress has been made to encourage American
clothing designers to be more "original" in their creations. Congress
cannot be blamed for not providing the opportunity, however. Even
in the 1991 design legislation that excluded clothing, Congress had
not forgotten about the textile industry:
MR. SANGMEISTER. The only other question I would have
then.., is, particularly last year there was a lot of
questioning.., due to concern about the garment industry,
and yet I see specifically they are excluded in this section
1002. Is there any particular reason for that?
MS. CASTLE. Mr. Chairman, if I might answer that, the
garment industry has always requested that it be excluded
from the legislation. Following the various iterations of this
bill and amendments to the copyright law, they have
determined that their protection is sufficient under other
intellectual property statutes, and they do not wish to be
included in the legislation. So we have simply continued that
exclusion which was originally at their request.
Thus, it is apparent that until the concerns of American clothing
designers who desire stronger design protection laws are given more
weight than those American manufacturers who desire to continue
the status quo, the likelihood that any clothing design protection
statute will be enacted is very slim. The impetus for such a statute
would have to come from either a societal or Congressional
determination that original American clothing design is valuable and
worthy of encouragement or from considerations of international
comity.
Congress may be particularly pressured to enact clothing design
234. Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 97 (statement of E. W. Bradford, Esq.,
Representing the National Design Registration League, Washington D.C.).
235. Design Innovation and Tech. Act of 1991, supra n. 208 (statement of Rita L.
Castle, chairwoman, the Design Coalition, accompanied by Bruce Lehman, attorney,
Swidler & Berlin).
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legislation, in light of the U.S.' obligations as a signatory of the World
Trade Organization's "Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights" ("TRIPS Agreement").236 Article 25(2)
of the TRIPS Agreement provides:
Each Member shall ensure that requirements for securing
protection for textile designs, in particular in regard to any
cost, examination or publication, do not unreasonably
impair the opportunity to seek and obtain such protection.
Members shall be free to meet this obligation through
industrial design law or through copyright law.237
A minimalist interpretation of this provision would suggest only
that some kind of low-cost protection for textile designs is required.
Accepting this interpretation, arguably the U.S. is meeting its
obligations under TRIPS because some design protection for textiles
is afforded through design patents, copyrights and trademarks. Also,
because the guiding principles of TRIPS are national treatment and
the reduction of trade barriers,238 it is hardly a trade barrier if foreign
and U.S. designers receive the same limited protection in the U.S.
However, if one interprets this provision more broadly as expressing
a policy that clothing designs should enjoy the maximum level of
protection possible, on a par equal to other forms of intellectual
property, the U.S. is in gross breach of its obligations. This is not a
new complaint. The impetus for the introduction of the 1914 design
legislation was explained as follows:
The thing that interested me in the bill and which started me
is the pressure we have from abroad largely, the feeling in
France, Belgium, and other European nations that are
particularly prominent as artistic people, that we do not
offer a fair protection to their designs ... [I]n many
countries they can put a number of designs into a single
envelope and pay one fee.., and here it costs $1 for each
design under this bill.239
236. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intell. Property Rights (Apr. 15, 1994) 33
I.L.H. 81.
237. Gen. Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade Negotiations Final Act
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, Annex 1C, pt. II, § 4,
art. 25 (Apr. 15, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1207.
238. See 33 I.L.H. at 93.
239. Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 49 (statement of Hon. Thomas Ewing,
U.S. Comm. of Pat.).
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While the U.S. has historically been able to loosely interpret
Article 25(2) up to now, this might change within the next few years.
The World Trade Organization ("WTO") notes in its 2001 report that
textile and clothing products must be fully integrated into WTO rules
by December 31, 2004, and that this will require a dramatic reduction
on quotas of imported clothing currently imposed by Canada, the
European Union, Norway, and the U.S.2 4 With a potential flood of
imported clothing to enter the U.S., strong clothing design protection
laws would be one way to restrict imports and protect domestic
industries.
Clothing design legislation could also have a positive impact for
consumers. While some clothing designs might increase in price as a
result of design protection laws, a good many more might decrease.
This result is suggested by the nature of the clothing design industry.
Currently, with no design protection laws, a designer must act quickly
and charge a premium for new designs before the goods are copied
and sold at lesser cost. 241 This result has distorted the fashion industry
significantly. As one fashion commentator explains:
Fashion houses, often headed by international
conglomerates, make substantial financial losses on their
haute couture collections, but these highly-publicized,
glamour-laden events provide the label prestige, which
make their numerous licensed goods so commercially
lucrative. Diffusion lines, consumer products and - most
significantly of all - perfume sales, continue to earn top
designers high salaries.
If design protection laws were implemented, designers could
charge less for each design, knowing that their investment would be
returned over a longer period of time. The fashion industry would
obviously benefit from clothing design protection in many ways. For
example, buyers from the designer would be more willing to purchase
in large quantities, because the risk of lower-priced alternatives
240. World Trade Organization, Market Access: Unfinished Business - Post-Uruguay
Round Inventory and Issues, at 20 <http://www.wto.org/englishlres e/booksp.e/chap2_e.pdf>
(accessed May 6, 2001). A recent report of the United States International Trade
Commission estimates that imports currently make up over one half of the U.S. apparel
market. USITC, Industry and Trade Summary: Apparel, Pub. 3169, at 1
<http://www.usitc.gov/332s/ 332index. htm> (March 1999).
241. Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 156 (statement of Mr. Richard H. Waldo,
Bus.Manager, Good Housekeeping Mag.).
242. Laver, supra n. 233, at 279-80.
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entering the market would be decreased."' Also, there is some
suggestion that haute couture buyers are more likely to commission
designs from countries where there is strong design protection,
because there is a greater chance that the design is truly original and
not a knockoff from some other source. 4 4
Concerns about monopolies on design elements and the stifling
of creativity through design legislation could be addressed through
careful drafting. In this regard, the U.S. might consider drafting a
design protection statute similar to that adopted by the United
Kingdom.245 These provisions demonstrate a balance between design
protection and public domain concerns. United Kingdom design
registration provisions are similar to copyright provisions in that a
design right comes into existence upon creation, and the protection it
extends is not an absolute monopoly but rather a right to prevent
copying.146 The design right does not apply to surface decoration or
textile designs, which are instead covered by copyright law. 47 Design
right protection is also much shorter than that accorded copyrights,
patents, or trademarks, lasting 10 years from first marketing of the
design, or a maximum of 15 years from date of creation and subject to
compulsory licensing after five years of use.4 While these provisions
would arguably satisfy the needs of most clothing designers, it does
not appear that they have been of great effect in the United
Kingdom. One commentator has noted that the United Kingdom
"has become a major producer of counterfeit goods, particularly in
the clothing sector., 249 Therefore, the U.S. might also wish to
incorporate strong enforcement provisions in any clothing design
registration statute.
Without action of any kind toward the protection of clothing
243. Registration of Designs, supra n. 56, at 154 (statement of Mr. Richard H. Waldo,
Bus.Manager, Good Housekeeping Mag.).
244. Id. at 211 (statement of Mr. Peter Gouled, Representing the Embroidery and
Lace Mfrs. Assn. of N.J.) ("A number of garment manufacturers ... who want exclusive
patterns, come to us and say ... 'We can never feel that you have exclusive patterns, that
you actually originate.'").
245. See generally Copyright, Design and Patents Act, 1988, c. 48 <http://
www.legislation. hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1988/Ukpga-19880048_en4.htm> (accessed May 6,
2001).
246. Ulla Vad Lane-Rowley, Using Design Protection in the Fashion and Textile
Industry 43 (John Wiley and Sons 1997).
247. Id. at 44.
248. Id. at 45.
249. Andrew Clark, The Use of Border Measures to Prevent International Trade in
Counterfeit and Pirated Goods: Implementation and Proposed Reform of Council
Regulation 3295/94, 20 Eur. Intell. Prop. Rev. 414, 417 (1998).
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design, the U.S. risks the further deterioration of its already
struggling apparel industry. Since 1997, the U.S. textile and apparel
industry has been steadily hemorrhaging jobs, with an estimated
177,000 jobs lost since 1997.250 In particular, New York City's apparel
industry was devastated by the September 11 attacks and is now
trying to rebuild itself through pleas to consumers to buy clothing
with the "Made in New York" label.5 While much of these job losses
are due to the internationalization of the apparel industry and the
outsourcing of labor to foreign countries, protection of clothing
design could help to revive the industry. We could do much more to
increase the number of designers in this country as well as attract
foreign designers to create in the United States. Even if designers
continue to outsource labor to foreign countries, an increase in the
number of designers could create jobs in other areas such as
marketing and sales. An increase in the number of designers could
also result in a greater diversity of clothing designs for consumers and
design competition would help to keep clothing prices affordable.
Also, if ultimately American design achieves the same cachet as
European design,252 clothing "Made in the U.S.A." could be a highly
desired international brand advantage (rather than just a patriotic
sentiment) that could help increase the number of labor-intensive
jobs in this country as well.
Granted, copy protection for designs would involve a change in
current fashion business practices. "Today, under the postmodern
rubric of 'referencing,' copying flourishes so openly that nobody
bothers to question it."' The practice is not limited to knockoff
designers. As noted recently, a vest in the spring 2002 collection
designed by Nicholas Ghesquiere for Balenciaga was a nearly
identical copy of a vest the little-known designer Kaisik Wong created
in 1973.254 While designers seem to appreciate the artistic freedom
250. American Textile Manufacturer's Institute, "Strong Dollar" Policy Devastates
U.S. Textiles <http://www.atmi.org/TheTextileCrisis/StrongDollar.pdf> (accessed May 7,
2002).
251. Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees, UNITE! Proudly
Made in New York <http://www.uniteunion.org/miny> (accessed May 7, 2002).
252. See Robin Givham, Continental Divide: Why Don't Europeans Cotton to
American Designs? The New York Shows Offer No Satisfying Answers, Wash. Post C1
(Feb. 19, 2002) (quoting a unidentified retail consultant as saying "American fashion is not
perceived in the world at large as a quality designer product .... America is associated
with cowboys and Indians and jeans. We're not associated with major designer clothing
collections.").
253. Cathy Horn, Is Copying Really a Part of the Creative Process?, N.Y. Times
<http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/09/fashion/09DRES.html> (Apr. 9, 2002).
254. I
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that comes with open copying, the rub comes in the lack of
recognition when their designs are reinterpreted by others. As
knitwear designer Lily Chin explains, "[I]f my name is not attached to
my creation, something is taken away from my reputation. After all,
the bigger picture is that it's really me that's being sold." '255 Even if
one does not agree that designers ought to own a right in their
creations sufficient to prevent the use of those designs by others, a
right of attribution seems unquestionable. Yet current U.S.




Clothing design protection in the U.S. is a controversial
proposition, that involves consideration of principles of free
competition, promoting creativity, reducing class mobility restrictions,
and defining roles and limitations for patent, copyright and trademark
law. The market distortions suffered by the fashion industry as a
result of design piracy have long called for a remedy, but as yet the
U.S. is unwilling to deliver. While currently affording protection to
surface decoration, fabric design, and labels, U.S. law is woefully
incomplete when it comes to protection of the "soul" of the clothing
design, the cut, and overall appearance. Whether this decision is
based on an assessment of artistic merit or a concern for public
welfare, it is an unjustifiable distinction for treating clothing designs
less favorably than other forms of intellectual property. Pressure from
the international community may ultimately drive the U.S. to correct
this injustice, but it would be far better for the U.S. to remedy this
problem on its own initiative and to provide encouragement and
respect for the American design industry.
255. E-mail from Lily Chin to Anne Briggs (Nov. 26, 2001) (on file with author).
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